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Highlights
• A practical system for human rights monitoring combining NLP and crowd-
sourcing
• Mining social media offers signals for human rights abuses in addition to reports
• Deep learning outperforms traditional machine learning in our classifcation task
• The Ceasefre raq platform has been continuously applied for several years
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Abstract
Effective information management has long been a problem in organisations that are
not of a scale that they can afford their own department dedicated to this task. Growing
information overload has made this problem even more pronounced. On the other hand
we have recently witnessed the emergence of intelligent tools, packages and resources
that made it possible to rapidly transfer knowledge from the academic community to in-
dustry, government and other potential beneficiaries. Here we demonstrate how adopt-
ing state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) and crowdsourcing methods has
resulted in measurable benefits for a human rights organisation by transforming their
information and knowledge management using a novel approach that supports human
rights monitoring in conflict zones. More specifically, we report on mining and clas-
sifying Arabic Twitter in order to identify potential human rights abuse incidents in a
continuous stream of social media data within a specified geographical region. Results
show deep learning approaches such as LSTM allow us to push the precision close to
85% for this task with an F1-score of 75%. Apart from the scientific insights we also
demonstrate the viability of the framework which has been deployed as the Ceasefire
Iraq portal for more than three years which has already collected thousands of wit-
ness reports from within Iraq. This work is a case study of how progress in artificial
intelligence has disrupted even the operation of relatively small-scale organisations.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Expert and intelligent systems have a long history but they have typically been con-
fined to larger organisations. Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) together
with the emergence of powerful AI tools that anyone can download and use present a5
paradigm shift, in that the threshold for entering the field has been lowered substan-
tially. This has opened the door for smaller organisations and charities to tap into the
huge potential of expert systems that did not have the resources to do so until now.
For such organisations, the field of information and knowledge management presents a
prime example where intelligent system support is becoming not just desirable but es-10
sential, be it for information filtering, information delivery or analytics to derive some
meaningful insights. Having said this, one should keep in mind that more and more in-
formation is now being pushed through social media channels which offers up-to-date
insights into emerging stories, e.g. (Carvalho et al., 2017). The flip side however is that
the growth of social media goes hand in hand with a growth in deliberate misinforma-15
tion, biased news, fake news etc. (Saquete et al., 2020).
We present a practical use case of a human rights organisation for which we devel-
oped an application that illustrates how the organisation benefits from a sophisticated
information filtering architecture while also addressing concerns around misinforma-
tion and privacy. More specifically, we demonstrate how adopting state-of-the-art nat-20
ural language processing (NLP) and crowdsourcing methods has resulted in an intelli-
gent system that supports human rights monitoring in conflict zones. The contribution
is two-fold in that we offer some theoretical insights into applying NLP to Arabic so-
cial media and some more practical findings about the deployment, customisation and
viability of the application.25
3
         
1.2. The Case of Human Rights Monitoring
Ever since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (The United Na-
tions, 1948), many human rights organisations have been established with a core mis-
sion of monitoring human rights and their violations in different countries across the
world. Until recently this work was conducted using largely the same underlying30
methodology (Alston et al., 2000).
More recently, technological advances have made it possible to deploy frameworks
that allow the recording of potential human rights violations through Web services al-
lowing organisations to conduct their mission in more productive and efficient ways.
A prime example of this trend is the fast-growing deployment of the open-source plat-35
form Ushahidi1, initially developed for collecting eyewitness statements to map reports
of violence in Kenya after the post-election violence in 2008. By employing a crowd-
sourcing approach, i.e. anyone can contribute, the platform can tap into communities
and witnesses that were previously difficult to reach out to. Reports can be submitted
anonymously and the platform offers a high level of application-side security. Ushahidi40
has since been deployed in a wide range of human rights reporting, election monitoring
and crisis response projects. Note however that any such application can only be a tool
to assist the monitoring of human rights abuses as none of them actually replace the
human analyst.
Apart from simple technological progress, there have been two further major devel-45
opments that offer new ways of working for human rights organisations – progress in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the ever-growing availability of data. Rapid progress in
AI (Russell and Norvig, 2016; Müller and Bostrom, 2016) means that AI applications
using machine learning are now ubiquitous, be it to rank the results of a Web search
engine, to control the electronics of a car or to classify social media feeds into cate-50
gories which could include the identification of potential human rights violations. In
particular the shift from sparsely available data (of high quality) collected by a team of
experts to massive streams of potential input signals in social media (of variable qual-
ity) offers completely new opportunities but also comes with caveats. Such data does
1http://www.ushahidi.com
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not have to be textual but also includes images, videos and other formats. For exam-55
ple, satellite imagery is now being employed by human rights organisations. A recent
example is the satellite image analysis in a project conducted by Human Rights Watch
to demonstrate the near total destruction of 214 villages in Burmas Rakhine State2.
Any technical solution proposed in the general problem area of human rights mon-
itoring does however face a range of challenges which vary depending on the actual60
application. For a crowdsourcing application the main challenge is to reach out to
the target audience in the first place in addition to providing a platform that users can
trust and easily use. Furthermore, there is the inherent problem of assessing how re-
liable each individual report is. Looking at AI-powered approaches that typically aim
at classifying massive amounts of data into pre-defined categories, the main challenge65
lies in having enough reliable training data and employing suitable machine learning
algorithms that offer sufficiently high-quality classification.
While these problems have been addressed for different use cases individually,
there has been no related work that offers a platform or a framework that facilitates the
reporting of human rights violations by civilians on the ground and by human rights70
organisations and their partners in a secure way and at the same time employs artifi-
cial intelligence in mining social media to identify additional indications of potential
human rights violations. Furthermore, previous work has looked into related problem
areas such as violence detection (Reynolds et al., 2011), offensive content detection
(Chen et al., 2012) and harassment detection on the Web (Yin et al., 2009). However,75
while related, these directions of work are not directly applicable for the problem at
hand.
This paper proposes a platform that brings together the two strands discussed above.
It can be seen as an analyst’s tool bench offering the monitoring of human rights viola-
tions within a specified geographical region with, on one hand, reports being submitted80
by experts as well as individual witnesses through a dedicated, structured reporting
system and, on the other hand, a continuous stream of social media data that have been
classified as signals of potential human rights violations within the same region. More-
2https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/19/burma-satellite-imagery-shows-mass-destruction
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over, the tool serves a dual purpose as in addition to its use for human rights monitoring
within an organisation it is also an instrument for reporting this to the general public.85
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first portal of its kind that combines the two
strands, and we demonstrate the viability of the framework which has been deployed
as the Ceasefire Iraq portal3 for more than three years which has collected thousands
of witness reports from within Iraq. The analysis of these reports has led to a series of
publications (policy documents) by Minority Rights Group International. The active90
response in social media, e.g. via tens of thousands of shares on Facebook, demon-
strates that it also serves the second intended purpose, offering a reporting tool to the
general public. Our immediate next steps include the deployment of the framework in
the wider Middle East and North Africa region.
1.3. Outline95
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of re-
lated work. It provides an overview of how human rights organisations traditionally
operate and how recent technological progress and advances in AI and natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) have impacted their work. We also look at existing tools and
frameworks. This discussion will conclude with the identification of shortcomings in100
existing approaches and motivate our contribution. Section 3 introduces our human
rights monitoring platform that emerges from the identification of the gaps in the land-
scape of existing solutions. The practical deployment as the Ceasefire Iraq portal and
added organisational structure and user security models are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 discusses our NLP-based approach to automatically identify potential105
Human Rights Abuse (HRA) posts on Twitter. It also provides the experimental re-
sults achieved by the approach, and the field results. Section 6 reflects on the results
and impact that have emerged from the deployment of the system. We also provide
some insight into lessons learned that should be of interest to our readers. In Section
7 we outline some future directions that have emerged from the work. Finally, our110
conclusions are presented in Section 8.
3http://iraq.ceasefire.org
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2. Background
In the decades following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948 (The United Nations, 1948), a global movement for human rights has taken
shape across the member states of the United Nations. Organisations across different115
sectors have pursued a wide range of approaches to the challenge of respecting, pro-
tecting and fulfilling human rights, in which the monitoring of violations has formed
an essential element. The persistence of human rights violations including gross vi-
olations in every world region today is evidence of the size and complexity of that
challenge. In recent decades technological tools have rapidly developed to assist in this120
task, but to understand their relevance and application it would be helpful to review
briefly the evolution of human rights monitoring in general as shown in Section 2.1.
The growing contribution of technology to support human rights monitoring in differ-
ent countries is discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 will highlight a specific platform,
Ushahidi, that has emerged as a viable tool that we also adopt as a backend in our ap-125
proach. Previous work on using NLP technology to support human rights monitoring
and related tasks is reviewed in Section 2.4 The main challenges faced by organisa-
tions working within the broader scope of human rights monitoring are summarised in
Section 2.5.
2.1. Development of Human Rights Monitoring130
International concern for atrocities committed in other parts of the world is ar-
guably as old as recorded history, but modern campaigns for human rights abroad are
often traced back to the movement against the international slave trade in the 19th
century (Hochschild, 1999, 2005). Whether it was detailing the abuses committed by
slavers or highlighting the appalling conditions in European colonies, such movements135
for change followed a familiar pattern: the presentation of documentary and photo-
graphic evidence by activist investigators or official fact-finders to a wide audience to
expose the nature of abuses being committed, elicit sympathy for the victims, but also
increasingly arouse a sense of injustice based on their status as holders of rights. In
many respects this fundamental set of techniques still forms the basis for much human140
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rights work today, with UN special rapporteurs and international NGO investigators
despatched from Geneva, New York or London to spend a week or two in a country
under scrutiny, interview victims and civil society, and return to present a report some
months later to the UN Human Rights Council, national authorities or the international
media.145
The further development of international legal standards on human rights follow-
ing the 1948 Universal Declaration and the growing professionalisation of human rights
work led in turn to the development of related approaches to monitoring and document-
ing human rights observance, such as:
• Monitoring the application of national laws and practices to ascertain their effect150
on human rights;
• Undertaking statistical and social science research to analyse the fulfilment of
human rights in given populations and the prevalence of discrimination on a
range of grounds;
• Monitoring news reports and records to identify both specific violations and to155
build a picture of emerging patterns of violation;
• Using the outputs of monitoring and documentation to substantiate claims for
redress before national courts or international human rights courts or monitoring
bodies (Puttick, 2017).
While inequalities in development and application of the rule of law across world160
regions meant that the state of human rights monitoring and documentation itself dis-
played marked disparities between states, a particular problem was presented by armed
conflict. Broadly speaking, the monitoring of violations of international humanitarian
law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict has not developed as strongly as human rights
monitoring (Lattimer and Sands, 2018) and this has been compounded in recent years165
by a growing lack of access to zones of conflict (Raad Al Hussein, 2016). Our approach
is focusing on finding solutions for the lack of access to zones of conflict. We iden-
tify crowdsourcing as an effective paradigm for monitoring human rights in conflict
8
         
areas bringing together automatic social media mining and online reporting allowing
civilians and researchers on the ground to directly report observed incidents.170
2.2. Growing Contribution of Technology
The development of the internet and the spread of mobile telephony have acceler-
ated the pace of change in human rights monitoring and, in some respects, altered its
character. However, monikers such as the Facebook revolution or the Twitter revolu-
tion applied to socio-political movements, including in the Middle East, are misleading175
with regards to human rights developments. Changes cannot be attributed to one ap-
plication, or even to social media as a whole, but are rather due to larger, generalized
effects that come from a confluence of technologies, in the context of wider social
awareness and human rights education, including in developing countries.
Specific examples of the contribution of new technologies relevant to human rights180
monitoring and documentation include:
• Digital collection of monitoring information to facilitate statistical analysis, and
digital storage off-site to protect security of information and human rights de-
fenders from repressive measures;
• Availability of sophisticated encryption techniques to safeguard security of hu-185
man rights communications;
• Crowdsourcing and geo-mapping platforms to pool monitoring information from
users and support analysis;
• Analysis of satellite imagery to provide evidence of certain large-scale viola-
tions, including destruction of buildings, villages or habitats, or to facilitate lo-190
cation of mass graves;
• Software enabling meta-data to be embedded in digital documents, photographs
and videos, assisting in the verification of evidence and chain-of-custody proce-
dures required in legal proceedings.
The significance of any particular technological development is perhaps less im-195
portant, however, than the huge expansion of internet access and smartphone usage in
9
         
the developing world. This marks a transformation in which human rights monitor-
ing is no longer the exclusive domain of professionals from the developed world but is
now increasingly a practice also owned by activists from communities directly affected.
The work discussed in this paper is aimed at exploiting this opportunity, without losing200
track of the fact that the positive advances promised by each technological innovation
are inevitably accompanied by potential threats or negative implications.
2.3. Ushahidi
One modern development that has already had a very beneficial impact on human
rights monitoring is the development of technology to collect data from non-experts.205
Ushahidi is a good example of the new tools that have become available. It is an open-
source crowdsourcing platforms that was initially developed to map reports of violence
in Kenya after 2008 post-election violence (Bailard and Livingston, 2014). It has been
widely used to monitor elections in different countries, e.g. in Kenya again in the 2017
elections4, but also, for example, to document post-election violence following the US210
elections in 2016.5 It has also been deployed for crisis response and advocacy & human
rights and such applications range from recording violations of media freedom and
threats to media workers in countries of the European Union6 to mapping technology-
based violence against women.7
Its maturity, open-source nature and large user community were the main factors215
for us to adopt Ushahidi as the backbone for our human rights monitoring platform. We
should note however that we had to develop additional layers of security and provide
support to collaborating organisations and will expand on these issues later on.
2.4. NLP Technology and Human Rights
Although machine learning and natural language processing are well-established220
research areas with steady progress in a variety of fields and applications over sev-






         
started outperforming many more traditional machine learning applications. The most
notable evidence for that is the proportion of research papers dedicated to neural net-
works and reporting significant advances over alternative methods at top academic con-225
ferences such as ACL8, EMNLP9, WSDM10 and NeurIPS11.
There has however only been limited interest in applying NLP and ML technolo-
gies for human rights monitoring, even in the broadest sense. There are nevertheless
related areas that did attract the interest of researchers, much of it applied to mining
and analyzing social media in one way or another, and we will provide a brief overview230
here. Note that we will drill down further into the separate area of Arabic NLP when
we discuss our approach to identifying potential human rights violoations in Twitter in
Section 5.
NLP technology has been used successfully to identify cybercrime, cyberbully-
ing, and violence detection (Whittaker and Kowalski, 2015; Kontostathis et al., 2010;235
Reynolds et al., 2011). We can distinguish two main lines of research in detecting
violence on the Web. The first is to analyse videos using computer vision techniques
(Nievas et al., 2011; Datta et al., 2002); the second is using text mining techniques
(Nobata et al., 2016; Chandrasekharan et al., 2017). There has been much research on
violent content detection in English social media but much less so on Arabic although240
there is now a growing body of research that starts building up, e.g. work on abusive
language detection on Arabic social media, e.g. (Mubarak et al., 2017), as resources
for Arabic in general and applied to social media more specifically have grown sub-
stantially, e.g. (Diab et al., 2018; Zirikly and Diab, 2015; Abdul-Mageed et al., 2014;
Awad et al., 2018; Aldayel and Azmi, 2016).245
A probabilistic violence detection model to identify text containing violent content
based on word prior knowledge about whether the word indicates violence or not was
proposed by Basave et al. (2013). To build a training corpus, they used OpenCalais






         
was built to classify a set of categories including Crimes, Accidents, War and Conflict.250
Everything else, e.g., documents on Education and Sports, was tagged as Non-violence
related. We considered the use of these datasets for our purposes; but unfortunately,
OpenCalais does not support Arabic, and the number of documents corresponding to
violence in Arabic Wikipedia is very small making the source dataset very sparse.
An offensive content detection model was proposed by Chen et al. (2012) to detect255
offensive language in social media. They introduced a set of lexical features like sim-
ple bag-of-words and n-grams, in addition to hand-written syntactic rules to identify
name-calling harassments. They used traditional machine learning techniques includ-
ing Naı̈ve Bayes and SVM to learn a classifier. Their proposed system employs a user
profile capturing the user’s English writing style.260
Harassment detection on the Web is another area of application of NLP techniques.
Yin et al. (2009) proposed a model for harassment detection on the Web using both lo-
cal features and contextual features. Local features are n-grams weighed using TF-IDF.
Contextual features are also used, under the assumption that each post is surrounded
by other posts from the community; chat-rooms and forums post style.265
In summary, a variety of approaches have been used to tackle related problems for
English, but to the best of our knowledge there is no previous work on the specific
issue of human right violation detection, let alone work applied to the Arabic language
in this context. Also, the accuracy achieved in previous work still tends to be rather
modest. We will present our own approach to the problem in Section 5.270
2.5. Challenges in Human Rights Monitoring
The traditional approach of human rights organisations is to use highly trained
professionals (researchers) to gather and verify information. These researchers visit
sites of human rights abuse and conduct detailed interviews with victims and witnesses
(Heinzelman and Meier, 2015). To the existing challenges for the practice of human275
rights, referenced earlier, can therefore be added a new set of challenges for moni-
toring presented by advances in technology. In conflict situations, or in states with
authoritarian governments, the democratization of human rights monitoring enabled
by contemporary technology potentially places at risk a large number of monitors who
12
         
might be targeted because of their activism. During the conflict in Syria, for exam-280
ple, media activists who sought to record the effects of bombing and other attacks in
their neighbourhoods suffered high rates of fatality or injury. So, new challenges of
verification, information security, and users awareness are raised.
Puttick identifies four categories of challenges for civilian-led monitoring in addi-
tion to digital and physical security risks (Puttick, 2017, 24-31):285
• Information deluge: Data-mining techniques in particular, as well as crowd-
sourcing, have to deal with the huge and ever-growing mass of information pre-
sented online, most of it irrelevant to the purpose at hand.
• Quality control: multiplying the number of monitors can lead to inconsisten-
cies, duplication of effort, and much greater variances in the quality of informa-290
tion produced.
• Verification: more fundamentally, there is a perception that crowd-sourced in-
formation is unreliable or untrustworthy. Although the reliability of human rights
claims made by official bodies, including governments, is often exaggerated,
there is no doubt that information gathered from a very wide range of different295
sources is likely to include some information that is falsified or misrepresented,
deliberately or otherwise.
• Ethical issues: finally, a wide range of ethical challenges includes threats to
privacy in the use of big data technology, and the safeguarding of interviewees
and other human rights victims. Non-professional monitors, not schooled in the300
principle of ‘do no harm’, may be less rigorous about seeking informed consent
and more inclined to share personal information online. Another problem with
sharing content online “is that the platforms on which activists rely – such as
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – are private companies governed by corporate
interest, whose terms of service are not necessarily tailored towards protecting305
human rights.”(Puttick, 2017, 29)
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2.6. Concluding Remarks
There are a number of conclusions we can draw from this discussion which will
motivate our work. First of all, we conclude that the traditional approach to human
rights monitoring has changed in recent years and that commonly applied methods are310
often simply no longer possible to apply. At the same time we observe that technol-
ogy has made significant progress and that in particular advances in machine learning
to mine social media for text clasification have been made. This goes hand in hand
with a better understanding of how to exploit crowdsourcing methods to extract mean-
ingful information from social media streams. We also witnessed the emergence of315
dedicated crowdsourcing platforms that can be deployed for online reporting allow-
ing civilians and monitors on the ground to directly report incidents of human rights
violations anonymously.
The gaps identified in addition to recent developments discussed motivates a frame-
work that serves the dual purpose of reporting human rights violations to the general320
public as well as a practical workbench for analysis within human rights organisations.
After all, such platform cannot operate without the human in the loop. Mining so-
cial media using NLP technology may help in finding early signals of potential human
rights violation providing analysts with more evidence and incidents and possibly links
to new witnesses. However, online reports will still need to be manually assessed and325
anonymized before they can be placed online for anyone to see. Apart from preserving
the anonymity of witnesses this protects victims and activists and allows the collection
of additional evidence without the need for personal interviews.
3. Ceasefire: A Platform to Support Grassroots Involvement in Human Rights
Reporting330
The exponential growth of data on the Web and, more specifically, in social media
has contributed to the perception that we no longer deal with simply larger-scale data
but with what is commonly referred to as Big Data.12 Tapping into this resource offers
12The term Big Data is not well-defined and is used with different meanings, but most typically to refer to
large data sets which are very hard to process using traditional approaches due to their size and complexity,
14
         
insights into a wide range of patterns and we argue that this will also benefit human
rights monitoring.335
The platform presented in this paper aims at painting a picture of human rights vio-
lation and abuse within a specific geographical region by bringing together two streams
of information: actual reports by witnesses, monitors and any civilian accessing the
system, and relevant information identified in a continuous stream of social media. In
other words, it supports user involvement, the merging of information coming from340
users and information coming from social media, and human rights organisations re-
porting in one place, as shown in Figure 1. It consists of two main components which
we will discuss in the following section: an online reporting tool, and an NLP-based
social media monitor (in this specific instance we use Twitter).
Figure 1: Ceasefire: a Framework for Reporting and Monitoring of Human Rights Abuses
Online reporting provides a secure crowdsourcing facility for victims, witnesses345
and activists to report human rights violation incidents. This first component can be
accessed by users who intend to report their experience to a human rights organisa-
tion. This component makes the information available to local and international human
e.g. see (Manyika et al., 2011).
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rights organisations while taking care of data security and accessibility. This part of the
platform was developed using Ushahidi as the backend, but with additional structural350
and security modifications discussed in Section 4.
The second component of our platform, based on ML-based classifiers that are
applied to the output of an NLP-pipeline, is used to discover human rights violations
reported in social media such as Twitter. Its purpose is to enrich the actual witness
statements and reports with additional signals mined from what locals within the region355
are reporting, particularly from areas where human rights organisations have limited
access. We will discuss this component and its underlying methodology in more detail
in Section 5.
The Ceasefire platform was developed together with Minority Rights Group Inter-
national using Iraq as a case study, but extensions to other countries in the Middle East360
and North Africa (MENA) region are currently under development.
4. Ceasefire Deployment
We will now provide a more in-depth overview of the Ceasefire platform with ref-
erence to its first major deployment.
4.1. The Online Reporting Service365
The first key component of the Ceasefire platform is an Online Reporting Service
that allows any user – victim, witness, activist, or human rights organisation – to submit
reports of human rights violation incidents. Two reporting interfaces are available, one
for the general public and another one that is dedicated to human rights organisations.
The data collected through the Online Reporting Service also paints an overall picture370
of the human rights situation at a specific geographical location. Figure 2 is a screen-
shot of the main page of Ceasefire, which shows a map of the geographical distribution
of the submitted reports in Iraq categorised by the type of violation (such as physical
abuse, psychological abuse, etc.).
As concluded in the previous section, we identified several benefits of an online re-375
porting service for the public and participating organisations. One of the main benefits
16
         
for organisations is that there is no need to expose interviewers to highly dangerous
environments, taking the example of Iraq, this would avoid sending anyone to Mosul
while under the control of ISIS. From the point of view of the public, the service allows
them to report incidents at any time and in a more confidential way than talking with380
a representative of an NGO, which are generally under surveillance. The feeling of
reporting directly to an international human rights organisation (instead of a possibly
suspicious intermediary), and the understanding that the information is treated more
securely, may also make the public more confident.
The online reporting facility was developed based on the open-source platform385
Ushahidi 2.7, which is based on PhP and uses MySql for its backend; but several
changes were necessary to the core Ushahidi engine to make it applicable in our con-
text, such as adjusting the Arabic right-to-left view and adding a new security model.
In order to get different human rights organisations involved, custom forms were de-
signed to fit their needs. These custom forms were designed by analysing the specific390
interview forms used by different organisations.
Every participating organisation can visualize a statistical analysis over the cate-
gories of submitted reports over a specific period of time. It was a core requirement
that this would be limited to reports submitted by the organisation’s own users or their
partner organisations. Figure 3 illustrates an example of the statistical distribution of395
reports over a three-month period. The categories used were developed and structured
by human rights experts.
Online reporting also has some disadvantages, however. The first disadvantage is
that it requires internet access, which may not be available in all areas. This problem
is however being reduced all the time by the rapid spread of internet-enabled devices.400
The second problem is making victims aware of its existence. Media such as TV,
radio, social media may be used to raise the public’s awareness of the existence of the
service. In our case study with Minority Rights Group, advertising on social media
targeting some areas in Iraq made a noticeable difference on the portal visits and the
number of submitted reports. A third problem is that centralising human rights abuse405
reporting may make it an easy target for governments which do not support such work.
That may put victims and reporters at a real risk, because if the government gets access
17
         
Figure 2: Ceasefire Main Page. Reports are plotted on the Map
to the reports, it may make use of the information to punish the people involved, or
destroy the data. Periodic backups may be a good defense for data destruction, but will
not help to protect information about victims and reporters. We will now discuss how410
we mitigate that risk.
4.1.1. Storing information
Three protection layers are used to deal with unauthorised access, as follows:
1. Basic user information is saved in encrypted form.
2. Incident details are not automatically posted to the public-facing portal. When415
a user submits a new report, it is not published until a trained reviewer has
anonymized all personal data, places, etc.
3. All Report Data are frequently pulled by another secure server, after which all
personal and other critical information on the Ceasefire servers is permanently
18
         
Figure 3: Ceasefire Reports Statistics. Results for a three-month Period.
deleted. So, the Ceasefire map continues to work, and the number of reports will420
remain the same, the reports remain classified according to the categories used,
but no identifiable information will be accessible. Also, the Ceasefire servers do
not save any information about these secure servers, which pull the data before
final anonymization.
4.1.2. Access control425
The existing security model in Ushahidi was judged to be insufficient for the Cease-
fire requirements. Therefore, a new security model and user access control were devel-
oped. It is not necessary for users to be registered to submit a report. But unregistered
users cannot retrieve their submitted reports for editing. Also, for some partner organ-
isations it was a requirement to register some users who would be able to keep track430
of their submitted reports. Once a registered user has been authenticated by the Cease-
fire engine, it is the Ceasefire security model’s role to determines the data the user is
allowed to see or modify. Users are organised in groups where every group has its own
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dedicated access level.
Organisations working in the project have a hierarchical structure, and some organ-435
isations are working as partners for other organisations. Every bit of information stored
on the Ceasefire platform has a security access level where the user or group who has
a higher access level can get access to it. Also, users defined in the same group can
get access to all reports submitted by the group. Any human rights organisation may
have one or more groups to work with different access levels as defined by the Cease-440
fire team. Users from partner organisations can also join the organisation’s groups. In
the Ceasefire Iraq use case, there are different organisations working on the ground in
Iraq under the Ceasefire umbrella. That model facilitates the independent operation of
different partner organisations and at the same time gives the Ceasefire team access to
all reports submitted by different partners. Problems with ‘elevated rights’ can con-445
tribute to unintentional data breaches, so Ceasefire enforces access controls on a ‘least
privilege model’ - with new users assigned only the most basic level of data access by
default.
4.2. The Social Media Classifier: Identifying Human Rights Abuse
The other major component of the framework to compile information about poten-450
tial human rights violations is the automatic classifier that is applied to a continuous
stream of social media feeds. Social media has become a means for people to let their
opinions be known. Oftentimes, victims discharge their anger on social media even if
they believe no one can or will do anything to relief their suffering. Other people do
not trust human rights organisations, and prefer to make their testimony known through455
social media rather than via reporting to human rights organisations. This may be be-
cause they do not know the organisation, or they may find using social media easier, or
they do not believe human rights organisations can make any difference.
The Ceasefire platform includes a continously running component that monitors
Twitter to find tweets which mention some form of human rights abuse (we call such460
tweets unintentional human rights abuse reporting). Figure 4 shows an example of a
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Figure 4: A Tweet classified as a potential Human Rights Abuse (HRA).
tweet13 that was classified as falling into that category and which will then be displayed
in the ”HRA on Twitter” section on the Ceasefire platform. While the public-facing
portal only ever displays the latest 100 identified tweets, the human rights analyst has
access to the full set as the data is saved for more in-house analytical work.465
Because Twitter’s terms and conditions prevent users from keeping or redistributing
the actual tweets, Ceasefire just keeps the corresponding identifiers. So, when a user
navigates to the social media feeds page, the Ceasefire engine calls the Twitter API to
retrieve the full tweet information. In cases where for some reason the original tweet
has been deleted by the user or by Twitter, it will no longer appear on Ceasefire either.470
The Ceasefire framework does not keep any personal information about Twitter users
either. We will now turn from the more practical considerations to the core academic
contribution. We will in particular explore the Arabic NLP processing steps applied
as well as report on experiments we conducted for building a classifier identifying
potential human rights violations.475
5. Automatically Identifying Potential Human Rights Abuses on Twitter
Our first case study, Ceasefire Iraq, was focused on Iraq. Our Twitter mining
method was therefore developed and tested on Arabic data. The popularity of social
media in the Arab world has grown dramatically over the last decade. According to the
13This translates to “Mosul today turned into Hiroshima. The federal police exterminate the Mahmudien,
Khazraj and Babelbead. A crime committed since the dawn of the day and continues to be committed”.
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Arab Social Media Report, there were 11.1 million Twitter users active monthly in the480
Arab world as of March 2017, posting on average around 27.4 million tweets per day
(Salem, 2017). Social media has become a regular source of daily updated information
as people share with others what they like and do not like, their political opinions, their
beliefs, and also what they see. Moreover, around 52% of users are reported to share
their political views on social media (Salem, 2017). Due to the dramatic problems485
plaguing much of the Arab world, a proportion of what people report about on social
media is violence and human rights abuse. As a result, Twitter has become a common
social media forum for people to share their experience.
As discussed earlier, research to detect, for example, offensive and violent content
in social media, in particular with a view on cybersecurity and monitoring cyberbul-490
lying has attracted a lot of attention, e.g. (Reynolds et al., 2011; Kontostathis et al.,
2010; Whittaker and Kowalski, 2015). But to the best of our knowledge there has been
no research on human rights abuse discovery in Arabic text which is clearly a serious
gap in the light of the earlier discussion. Unlike typical settings in other common clas-
sification tasks, as for example sentiment analysis, we are looking at under-resourced495
languages (Arabic in our current case study) and at non-standard categories (either bi-
nary or multi-label). Apart from contributing to the understanding of the problem, the
automatic mining of information about potential human rights abuses provides an ad-
ditional stream of signals that supplements detailed reports and this data actually forms
an integral part of the human rights monitoring platform introduced in the previous500
section. We will now discuss our approach to the problem as applied to the Ceasefire
Iraq portal.
5.1. Text Preprocessing
Preprocessing platforms for Arabic have started to become more widely available,
e.g. (Althobaiti et al., 2014), however processing of social media texts remains a chal-505
lenge. The first step of preprocessing carried out in our work is removing Arabic stop
words and web links from the text. Secondly, a step of orthographic normalization is
carried out. Because mistakes in writing Arabic letters like “Alef” and “Yaa” are com-
mon, different “Alef” forms are normalised to a single form, and the same for “Yaa”
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(Darwish, 2002). Finally, all numbers are replaced with one digit as a place holder,510
preserving the existence of numbers in the tweet text regardless the actual value.
5.2. Morphological processing
Arabic has a complex morphological structure (Al-Sughaiyer and Al-Kharashi,
2004). Various types of affixations are added to the base word to encode grammat-
ical categories like number, gender, and tense. Masculine and feminine forms of a515
word differ. In Arabic, the single, plural and double form of the word are distinguished
(double is not considered a plural in Arabic). Also, short vowels called “Diacritics”
are not always written and the word with no diacritics could be interpreted as differ-









@” (Kotob) which means “books”. The right520
interpretation depends on the context.
So, in addition to token features, additional morphological features are extracted to
reduce the noise in the vector space. The MADAMIRA package (Pasha et al., 2014)
was used to carry out morphological analyses of the text. Table 1 shows the feature
vector length when using each feature and an example of the feature when using the525
word “ 	á
K. AÖÏ @” which could mean a couple of injured persons or a group of injured
people. The diacritized form means a couple of injured people. Both diacritized and
non-diacritized are in masculine form. Lemma form means an injured person in singu-
lar masculine form. In this example both lemma and stem have the same meaning.
Feature Description FV length Example
Token The text form after preprocessing 40,692 	á
K. AÖÏ @
Diacritized Word with most probable diacritics. 42,413 	á

K. AÜÏ @
Lemma The canonical form of the word. 17,784 H. A
Ó
Stem The word stem without prefix or suffix. 13,480 H. A
Ó
Table 1: Feature Vector (FV) lengths for different types of preprocessing
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5.3. Identifying Potential Human Rights Abuses as a Classification Problem530
Identifying potential Human Rights Abuses (HRA) is treated as a binary classifi-
cation problem: each tweet is classified as HRA or non-HRA. Tweets are encoded as
feature vectors (Salton et al., 1975). Different feature weighting schemes were tested,
including Binary, TF, TF-IDF. Lexical and morphological features are extracted from
the tweet text, then used to learn different models.535
Two classical training methods were used to learn HRA detection using the pro-
posed features. A Naı̈ve Bayes classifier with binary Vector Space Model (VSM) was
used as the baseline approach. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier was trained
with two different kernels, linear and Gaussian (Schölkopf and Smola, 2002).14 SVMs
have traditionally been demonstrated as very effective for text classification tasks. Pre-540
cision, Recall, and F1 were used as commonly applied evaluation metrics.
More recently, deep learning methods have been shown to be very effective for text
classification, e.g. (Miroczuk and Protasiewicz, 2018; Chen et al., 2017). So in addition
to Naı̈ve Bayes and SVM, we trained models based on those neural network models that
have been shown to be most effective at text classification, namely Convolutional Neu-545
ral Networks (CNN), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Bi-Directional LSTM
(biLSTM).
5.4. Creating a Gold Standard Dataset for Training and Testing
The Arabic Violence in Twitter (AVT)15 dataset is a test collection created as part
of the project and used in our experiments (Alhelbawy et al., 2016). AVT is a corpus550
of violence acts in Arabic Twitter manually annotated using crowdsourcing. It consists
of 20,151 tweets covering violent acts such as killing, raping, kidnapping, terrorism,
invasion, explosion, or execution, etc.
Five annotators classified every tweet into one of eight classes: Crime, Accident,
Human Rights Abuse, Conflict, Crisis, Violence, Opinion, and Other. The ‘Human555
Rights Abuse’ category is defined as the tweets that mention an act that may be consid-
14The Scikit-Learn package (Pedregosa et al., 2011) was used to carry out our experiments.
15Downloadable from : https://github.com/Alhelbawy/Arabic-Violence-Twitter
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The army of Assad committed a terrible massacre in Damascus,
claiming the lives of dozens of children in their school video images
HRA
Table 2: Examples of HRA and non-HRA tweets from the AVT dataset.
ered as a human rights violation according to international definitions, such as crimes
committed by government, militia, or organisations against civilians. As we are just
interested in Human Rights Abuse detection, only the HRA class is used and all other
classes are treated as non-HRA. Table 2 shows two examples of tweets that mention560
violence episodes, one classified as HRA, the other as non-HRA.
Different annotators may assign different classes for the same tweet. The single
label for a tweet was therefore determined using as aggregation criterion a class confi-
dence score16 CS, calculated as shown in Equation 1, where Ci refers to class i, K is
the set of all contributors judging a certain tweet, M is the set of contributors assigning565
a tweet to class Ci, and TSj is the Trust Score for a contributor j where 0 < j < k






The aggregate class confidence score threshold is set to discard all tweets with low
class confidence score. Only tweets with a confidence score above 0.45 are used in our
experiments resulting in 16,292 tweets distributed over eight classes.570
As we are training a classifier to detect HRA incidents, we used HRA as the main
16https://success.figure-eight.com/hc/en-us/articles/201855939-How-to-Calculate-a-Confidence-Score
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(positive) class, and all other classes, Crime, Accident, Conflict, Crisis, Violence, Opin-
ion, and Other were aggregated into one, non-HRA class. Such setup makes the task
more challenging where there are a good number of negative examples (14,424 sam-
ples) which have a high level of overlap with the positive examples (1,868 samples).575
70% of the dataset is used for training and 30% for testing. Table 3 shows the resulting
number of tweets used for training and testing in each class.
Class Train Test Total %
HRA 1,303 565 1,868 11.5
Non-HRA 10,101 4,323 14,424 88.5
Total 11,404 4,888 16,292
Table 3: AVT Dataset Details
To study data separability, two clustering algorithms were used to cluster the dataset
into two clusters. The first is k-means, a hard clustering algorithm (Hartigan and Wong,
1979). A soft clustering algorithm was also used, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)580
(Blei et al., 2003). For each instance, the topic assigned the highest probability is
used as the instance class. For each of the clustering algorithms, the training data
is used to assign each cluster to one class aiming at distinguishing HRA and non-
HRA as representing the two clusters. Table 4 shows the results of clustering the test
dataset into two clusters using LDA and k-means, respectively. The results shows a585
high level of overlap between HRA and non-HRA classes. A further evaluation for
the clustering results was carried out by calculating homogeneity and completeness of
clusters (Rosenberg and Hirschberg, 2007). For LDA, we obtain homogeneity = 0.07
and completeness = 0.04; and 0.0002 and 0.0004, respectively, for k-means. These
results can be interpreted as meaning that the data does not naturally split into the590
classes we aim to model. The main conclusion from these results is that there is a high
degree of overlap between HRA and non-HRA tweets.
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Clustering K-means LDA
Class HRA Non-HRA HRA Non-HRA
Cluster1 509 4,167 101 2,410
Cluster2 35 242 443 1,999
Table 4: Dataset separability analysis
5.5. Classification results
The two classical classifiers performed reasonably well at identifying HRA on
Twitter. Bag of Words (BoW) was used in our experiments as feature representation.595
We explored different weighting scheme (Binary, TF, and TF-IDF), but TF-IDF tended
to achieve overall better results, so we only report those results in this paper.
Table 5 shows the results at HRA detection using Naı̈ve Bayes and SVM classifiers
with different kernels. The baseline Naı̈ve Bayes achieves the highest recall across all
tested classifiers, but very low precision. The SVM classifiers achieved good results600
with both kernels. Our results show that the linear kernel outperformed the Gaussian
kernel in terms of recall, but not precision.
Feature
Naı̈ve Bayes SVM (Linear) SVM (Gaussian)
P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
Token 25.1 94.3 40.2 65.3 61.2 63.1 85.3 50.9 63.7
Diacritized 38.5 67.2 49.1 49.8 53.1 51.4 76.6 42.9 54.9
Lemma 40.6 52.9 46.2 51.1 38.2 43.6 76.8 27.2 40.0
Stem 44.1 44.1 44.1 62.3 26.1 36.7 81.9 23.3 36.2
Table 5: HRA Classification Results (Precision / Recall / F1), confidence = 0.45, 10-fold cross validation
As discussed in Section 5.2, two sets of features were tested, some resulting in high-
dimensional feature vectors, some in low-dimensional ones. Table 1 (in Section 5.2)
shows the dimensions of each feature vector. We note that Token and Diacritized fea-605
tures result in high dimensional vectors (> 40, 000) while using Lemmas or Stems re-
duces this by more than 50%. We also observe that incorporating diacritics does not im-
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prove the results over using simple tokens, indicating an increase in non-discriminating
features. Furthermore, morphological analysis (i.e., as reflected by Lemma and Stem)
does not appear to boost the performance in either of the SVM settings. A possible610
explanation can be found when analysing the misclassified samples: most of these are
written in Dialectal Arabic (DA).17 By contrast, available morphological analysers are
designed to analyse Modern Standard Arabic (MSA)18 or the Classical Arabic (CA)19
so perform best with those varieties of Arabic. Failure to extract morphological fea-
tures properly is likely to result in improper tweet representation and misclassification.615
We also explored deep neural networks for the classification task at hand.20 We
applied Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) in two different varieties, LSTMs, and
bidirectional LSTMs, and we conducted the experiments as follows. Let D be a tweet
with n tokens, and let ti be the ith token in tweet D, where each ti ∈ D is represented
by a k-dimension embedding vi ∈ Rk. Tweet document D is converted to a matrix620
of shape (30 × k) where every row represents a token vector of length k with k either
100 or 300. The maximal-length token sequence (of tokens in a tweet) is set to 30, and
zero-padding is used if the tweet tokens are less than 30. For all models, distributed
word embedding representations were presented in the input layer. Word2Vec was used
to train word embedding vectors with 100 and 300 dimensions using a corpus of col-625
lected tweets. Because the number of examples used in training is relatively small
given the number of training parameters, overfitting problems were observed. Dropout
regularisation was therefore used to prevent the model from overfitting.21
Our basic CNN architecture consisted of three convolutional layers, each followed
by a max pooling layer with pool size of 3 and at each layer 64,32,16 filters and kernel630
17The term ‘Dialectal Arabic’ is used to indicate the varieties of Arabic spoken in different regions: the
Maghreb, Egypt, the Middle East, etc.
18Modern Standard Arabic or Fusha is the language of formal writing and speech in Arab countries and it
is understandable across Arab countries.
19Classical Arabic is the old version of the standard Arabic used in the Quran and in the early Islamic
literature from the 7th-9th centuries.
20All experiments were run with Keras and Tensorflow as backend.
21Dropout means that a percentage of units are randomly dropped out from the neural network during
training to prevent units from co-adapting too much (Srivastava et al., 2014).
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size 5,3,3 respectively. The last max pooling layer is fully connected to a dense layer of
size 256. Two different dropout values were tested to avoid overfitting in two different
CNN architectures. The first CNN architecture, referred as CNN0.2, applied dropout
of 0.2 on the output of the first convolution layer. The second architecture, CNN0.5,
applied dropout of 0.5 after all convolution layers which improves precision but de-635
creases recall. Overall we observe some improvement in terms of F1 score as shown in
Table 6. Obvioulsy, there is always a trade-off between precision and recall, but in our
application we are mainly focussing on high F1.
CNN0.5 CNN0.2 LSTM biLSTM
Output dim P R F1 P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
Softmax 100 75.8 59.3 66.5 77.5 58.6 66.7 84.4 65.1 73.5 78.5 69.7 73.9
Softmax 300 82.1 55.2 66.0 75.6 59.1 66.3 82.5 69.2 75.3 81.1 64.6 71.9
Sigmoid 100 74.7 64.2 69.1 76.7 57.2 65.5 83.5 66.2 73.8 75.7 71.5 73.5
Sigmoid 300 80.6 55.0 65.4 73.9 57.5 64.7 81.3 66.4 73.1 78.1 68.7 73.1
Table 6: Deep Neural Network (DNN) Classification Results
Our LSTM model consists of 50 LSTM units and dropout 0.2. The bi-directional
LSTM is tested with the same settings where both forward and backward outputs con-640
catenated before being passed on to the next dense layer.
For all our neural network architectures, the final classification is generated by
either a sigmoid or softmax function and both functions were tested in our experi-
ments. For reproducibility purposes we also report, that Tensorflow and numpy random
number seeds are set to 123 before any experiment.645
Table 6 shows the results of all deep neural network experiments. The best results
were obtained with the LSTM model, using softmax and size 300 for the word embed-
dings. In general, using softmax activation in the output layer improves the precision.
Overall, the CNN, LSTM, and bi-LSTM models using word embeddings substantially
improve on the classical approaches, i.e Naı̈ve Bayes and SVM, by almost ten percent-650
age points.
The experimental results do offer some insights for future work. First of all, we
observe that the use of neural network-based methods outperforms traditional statistical
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methods in the application at hand. While not surprising, it is an interesting finding
that derived directly from our systematic comparisons. The implication is that we will655
pursue more advanced neural architectures such as Transformers (Vaswani et al., 2017)
to further push the classification quality.
On a more practical side, we find that the classification accuracy is of high enough
quality for the NLP pipeline to be used in the live environment. In this case we are
primarily aiming at high precision (rather than recall) and a precision of about 85%660
makes this approach viable for practical use.
6. Overall Impact of the Platform
The Ceasefire Iraq portal was originally tested as an internal deployment. The
first report by a partner organisation of Minority Rights Group (MRG) was submitted
in February 2016, hence the portal has been running for more than three years now.665
It opened to the public towards the end of 2016. We run several Facebook advert
campaigns starting in April 2017 until September 2017. These were targeted at the
geographic region covered by the Ceasefire Iraq deployment.
While the portal has become an important tool for analysts within MRG, we also
note that it has become a way of monitoring the human rights situation in Iraq to the670
general public, therefore serving both purposes as outlined in the motivation. Figure
5 shows the Ceasefire administrator dashboard. More than 3,000 reports have by now
been submitted from different locations in Iraq, distributed over 32 categories of human
rights abuse. These incidents are submitted by civilians as well as partner organisations
and are shown on the map with details to drill down. Partner organisations are regis-675
tered with Ceasefire and use the platform to submit their reports accessing and mod-
ifying their reports using the security model discussed earlier. The collected reports
contributed to a number of publications by human rights organisations, including:
• Eyes on the Ground: Realizing the potential of civilian-led monitoring in armed
conflict (Puttick, 2017)680
• Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Asuda, 2018)
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• A Rising Tide: Monitoring and Documenting Violence against Women in Seven
Iraqi Governorates, 2014-2016 (Asuda, 2017)
• Civilian Activists under Threat in Iraq (Ceasefire Center For Civilian Rights and685
Minority Rights Group International, 2018).
Figure 5: Ceasefire Iraq Dashboard
Ceasefire was also mentioned by the Canadian All-Party Parliamentary Group for
the Prevention of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity (GPG) in their re-
port ”Leveraging New Technologies to Prevent and Monitor Genocide and Other Mass
Atrocities” as one of their case studies (Canadian All-Party Parliamentary Group for690
the Prevention of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity , 2018).
In addition to the academic evaluation we also assessed the practical usefulness
of the Twitter mining tool for the analysts’ work. To do this we carried out a field
evaluation. A set of 200 randomly selected tweets identified as HRA by our Twitter
monitor was reviewed manually by an expert. The expert confirmed 157 of them as695
actual reports of an HRA incident. This result, i.e. precision of 78.5%, is very close to
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the experimental results we obtained by evaluating our classifier on a test set. This was
deemed of high enough quality to be used in the practical setting.
7. Future Work
There are a number of future directions opening as a result of our work. We outline700
some of them here. First of all, we have so far only started to tap into what NLP offers.
Including Named Entity Recognition (NER) is our immediate next step that offers sub-
stantial obvious benefits for the full text processing pipeline. Unlike in applications that
process news articles or generic documents we do however face the problem that NER
cannot easily be combined with a Named Entity Disambiguation (NED) and Linking705
(NEL) step as resources that are commonly used for such steps are only partially avail-
able and usable in our application. For example, the Arabic Wikipedia does cover a
range of relevant geographic location entries but this is not the case for person names.
Linking does neverthelesss offer a promising future direction in that we plan to link
incidents mentioned in the tweets based to other sources of information like local news710
articles.
In terms of accuracy, we are currently working on more advanced deep learning
architectures to improve the precision of potential human rights abuse identification.
Transformers (Vaswani et al., 2017) are one such direction that have already been
shown to offer substantial gains in various NLP tasks.715
Furthermore, our models work fine in automatically identifying many incidents
from social media. However, there is commonly a high volume of redundancy as the
same incident may be reported by many people. So, another direction for future work
is to apply a clustering step to capture such redundancies. Again, this is not as straight-
forward as in news because we are dealing with short social media messages of varying720
quality rather than well-written news articles.
We are currently also working on building a range of separate models for different
Arabic dialects. This allows us to increase the overall accuracy of the approach as, for
example, expressions may have different meanings in different Arab countries.
On the deployment side, we are already in the process of rolling out the portal to725
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the wider Middle East and North Africa region.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we presented Ceasefire, a platform that supports grassroots-based hu-
man rights monitoring in addition to assisting human rights organisations in their work.
The platform also serves as an information portal to the general public providing an in-730
sight into human rights violations and abuses within a specific geographical region.
Ceasefire has been active for more than three years; during this period, it has proven
that grass-roots based monitoring is a viable alternative to the riskier strategy normally
adopted by human rights organisations. Our improved security and structural organisa-
tion model incorporated in an existing open-source reporting framework helped us to735
convince a number of organisations to collaborate in the portal using a unified frame-
work. In addition to manually submitted reports, NLP technology has been exploited
to identify potential human rights abuse incidents from social media with an accuracy
of about 85%, which is promising given the motivation to employ this technology to
tap into the many signals obtained from social media by the many victims of such inci-740
dents that might not trust human rights organisations or are not aware of the existence
of portals such as Ceasefire. Among the technical contributions, this work is to the best
of our knowledge the first attempt to use NLP technology for human rights abuse iden-
tification from social media. Our work also suggests that deep neural network models
such as LSTMs and bi-LSTMs outperform conventional text classification approaches745
such as SVMs which is in line with findings in other NLP areas.
We should also outline some limitations of our work. First of all, our specific use
case makes it difficult to compare it against results reported in the related literature
even when looking only at certain aspects of the overall system. However, our findings
can serve as a benchmark for future studies. Furthermore, we have adopted a classifi-750
cation scheme (of human rights violations) that is based on the actual setting within the
organisation. It is of course unclear how the results will compare with those obtained
from a different classification scheme. Again, the best way to address this issue is by
treating our findings as a benchmark for future researchers. Finally, machine learning
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has made massive progress within the last few years and studies conducted on what is755
the state of the art today look like they are out of date already tomorrow. By describing
our experimental setups in sufficient detail we aim to offer a solid basis for experiments
to be replicated and contrasted against alternative approaches.
The success of the Iraq use case has motivated the participating organisations to
get involved in an effort to use this technology to develop new platforms to support760
monitoring in more countries, and we are currently in the process of rolling the platform
out to the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Miriam Puttick for her support and manual review
of test cases. Also, we want to thank Minority Rights Group International and Innova-765
teUK for funding part of this research work through a Knowledge Transfer Partnership
(KTP) project between MRG and the University of Essex (grant number KTP9488).
The research was also in part supported by the UK Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) through the Big Data Human Rights and Technology project (grant
number ES/M010236/1).770
References
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